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Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules Preventing Attorney
Advertising and Solicitation: Consumer Loses With the
Zauderer Decision
No aspect of legal ethics has been more hotly debated than attorney adver-
tising and solicitation.I Conflict among members of the bar intensified when, in
1977, the United States Supreme Court proclaimed that attorney advertising was
protected under the newly created commercial speech doctrine of the first
amendment.2 Nearly ten years have passed since that decision and the contro-
versy rages on. The primary reason this issue remains unresolved is that the
Supreme Court insists on addressing attorney advertising and solicitation cases
in an ad hoe manner and on fashioning its decisions as narrowly as the facts in
each case will allow.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel3 the Court had another oppor-
tunity to establish rules that would resolve the controversy, but once again the
Court refused to do so. Attorney Phillip Zauderer ran a newspaper advertise-
ment that informed users of Intrauterine Devices (IUDs) of the dangers of the
Dalkon Shield IUD and indicated that readers who had been injured by the
Dalkon Shield might be able to recover damages from the manufacturer. In the
advertisement Zauderer offered to represent readers on a contingent fee basis
and offered to give free information to people who telephoned him.4 The State
of Ohio disciplined Zauderer on grounds that the advertisement contained an
illustration, failed to include necessary information concerning the contingent
fee, and solicited business in violation of the Ohio Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. 5 The Supreme Court held that the drawing and the advice contained in
the advertisement were protected under the first amendment, but that
Zauderer's failure to include additional information pertaining to the contingent
fee justified the disciplinary action.6
This Note traces the evolution of the first amendment's commercial speech
1. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text; note 165 (illustrating breadth of debate).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct draw a distinction between "solicitation" and "ad-
vertising." However, these rules fail to define solicitation clearly: "The term 'solicit' includes con-
tact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication
directed to a specific recipient .. " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
Nor do the Rules define advertising. Instead, they state that "a lawyer may advertise services
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical,
outdoor, radio or television, or through written communication not involving solicitation as defined
in rule 7.3." Id. Rule 7.2(a) (1983). "The term 'solicit' includes [a]... communication directed to a
specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally
to persons not known to need legal services... but who are so situated that they might in general
find such services useful." Id. Rule 7.3 (1983). This distinction is somewhat artificial because solici-
tation is a form of advertising.
2. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). First amendment rights in commercial speech
were recognized in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
3. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
4. Id. at 2272.
5. Id. at 2273-74.
6. Id. at 2280-81.
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doctrine through Supreme Court cases decided prior to Zauderer and discusses
the application of the commercial speech doctrine in attorney advertising and
solicitation cases. It also discusses the problems the intermediate level of protec-
tion afforded commercial speech poses for attorneys who wish to advertise or
solicit and concludes that the uncertainty surrounding this intermediate level of
protection, even after the Zauderer decision, discourages attorneys from reach-
ing consumers through the media. Furthermore, the Note explores the injury
that consumers suffer due to the lack of information available about legal serv-
ices in the marketplace. It uses the issue of direct mail solicitation to illustrate
the problems both attorneys and consumers face in light of the Supreme Court's
insistence on rendering very narrow decisions in attorney advertising and solici-
tation cases. The Note concludes that the Supreme Court should establish gen-
eral guidelines that protect and encourage a wide array of attorney advertising
and solicitation.
For two days in late 1981 attorney Phillip Q. Zauderer ran the following
advertisement in a Columbus, Ohio newspaper: "Full Legal fee refunded if con-
victed of DRUNK DRIVING. Expert witness (chemist) fees must be paid." '7
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Ohio Supreme Court contacted
Zauderer on the second day and informed him that the advertisement appeared
to be an offer to represent a criminal defendant on a contingent fee basis in
violation of the Ohio Disciplinary Rules.8 Zauderer withdrew the advertisement
that day.9
Undaunted, Zauderer placed a "more ambitious"10 advertisement in thirty-
six Ohio newspapers in the spring of 1982:
The Dalkon Shield... is alleged to have caused serious pelvic infec-
tions resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hyster-
ectomies. It is also alleged to have caused unplanned pregnancies
ending in abortions, miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic
pregnancies, and full-term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a
similar experience do not assume it is too late to take legal action
against the Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm is presently represent-
ing women on such cases. The cases are handled on a contingent fee
basis of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are
owed by our clients.1
The advertisement attracted 200 inquiries, and Zauderer initiated 106 lawsuits
on behalf of those who contacted him. 12
7. Joint Appendix to Briefs at 8, Zauderer.
8. The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits attorneys from handling criminal
cases on a contingent fee basis. 01110 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C)
(1983). Ohio's rule is identical to the rule found in the ABA's Model Code. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-106(C) (1981).
9. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2271.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2271-72.
12. Id. at 2272. The advertisement contained an illustration of the Shield. Zauderer was hired
by 53%. of those who contacted him concerning the Dalkon Shield. He previously had run an
advertisement without an illustration of the Shield and had received virtually no response from that
advertisement. Stewart, A Picture Costs Ten Thousand Words, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1985, at 62-63.
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On July 29, 1982, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint
against Zauderer charging that both advertisements violated the Ohio Discipli-
nary Rules. The Disciplinary Counsel alleged that the drunk driving advertise-
ment violated Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(A)13 by offering a fee arrangement that could not be carried out under the
Ohio rules14 and thus was false, fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive to the
public. The Disciplinary Counsel also alleged that the Dalkon Shield advertise-
ment violated five disciplinary rules.1 5 First, it contained an illustration in viola-
tion of Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), 16
which prohibits illustrations and drawings in advertisements run by attorneys
and requires that advertisements be "dignified" and include nothing other than
twenty items specified in the rule.17 Second, the advertisement gave legal advice
concerning the Dalkon Shield and suggested that interested women contact
Zauderer. The state claimed that this violated Ohio Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A),18 which prohibits attorneys from rec-
ommending employment of themselves or those who work with them to the
general public. '9 Third, the Dalkon Shield advertisement also allegedly violated
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A), 20 which
prohibits an attorney who has given unsolicited advice from accepting employ-
ment as a result of that advice.21 Fourth, Zauderer's mention of a contingent fee
triggered the requirements of Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Discipli-
13. The rule reads: "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself... or his firm, use, or participate
in the use of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, decep-
tive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101(A) (Page 1983). The ABA rule is identical to Ohio's rule. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1981) (1981).
14. Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-106(C) prohibits contingent
fees in criminal cases. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (Page 1983).
This provision is identical to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1981).
15. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
16. Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) states in pertinent
part:
A lawyer may publish or broadcast... in print media or over radio or television.... The
information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication ... shall comply with DR 2-
10 1(A) and be presented in a dignified manner without the use of drawings, illustrations,
animations, portrayals, dramatizations, slogans, music, lyrics or the use of pictures, except
the use of pictures of the advertising lawyer, or ... a portrayal of the scales of justice.
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (Page 1983). The rule catalogs 20
pieces of information that can be included in the advertisement. Id.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(3) differs in that it restricts
advertising to the geographic area in which the attorney practices and does not restrict the use of
drawings and illustrations in advertisements. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101(B) (1981). The list of permissible information in the Model Code includes categories not
in Ohio's Code, but the substance of the two codes is the same.
17. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2272.
18. Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A) states: "A lawyer
shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a
non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." OHIO CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (Page 1983). This provision is substantially identical
to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981).
19. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
20. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) (Page 1983).
21. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2273.
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nary Rule 2-101(B)(15) 22 that advertisements of "[c]ontingent fee rates... [dis-
close] whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs
and expenses."' 23 Zauderer's advertisement did not include this information.
Last, the advertisement allegedly violated Ohio Code of Professional Responsi-
bility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A)24 because it failed to specify that clients would
be liable for costs and fees even if their claims were unsuccessful and thus was
deceptive.25
The Board of Commissioners on Grievance and Discipline2 6 heard the
charges against Zauderer. The Board ruled that the drunk driving advertise-
ment violated Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(A) because it failed to mention the common practice of plea bargaining and
thus failed to alert potential clients that they might be found guilty of a lesser
offense and still be liable for attorney's fees.27 This ruling differed from the
grounds originally set forth in the complaint filed against Zauderer. The Board
ruled that the Dalkon Shield advertisement violated each of the rules as charged
in the complaint.28 The Board rejected Zauderer's claim that the rules as ap-
plied to him violated the first amendment's free speech guarantee2 9 and recom-
mended that he be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.30 The Ohio
Supreme Court adopted the findings that Zauderer's conduct violated each rule
alleged and that the first amendment did not protect the advertisement. The
22. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)(15) (Page 1983).
23. Id.
24. Id. DR 2-101(A).
25. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2273. An attorney may advance or guarantee the expenses of litiga-
tion provided that the client remains ultimately responsible. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (Page 1983). The reason for this requirement is to prevent the attorney
from acquiring a financial interest in a client's suit. See id. DR 5-103(A). These rules seek to keep
an attorney's professional judgment free from any personal interest and thus discourage overreach-
ing. See id. EC 5-2 to -7.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel stipulated in Zauderer that the information and advice con-
cerning Dalkon Shield litigation in the advertisement was accurate and that the illustration was an
accurate depiction of the Dalkon Shield. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2273.
26. The disciplinary procedure in Ohio is similar to that of most states. The prosecuting attor-
ney is called the Disciplinary Counsel and is appointed by the Ohio Supreme Court. This individual
investigates alleged violations and prosecutes in disciplinary actions. Each local bar has its own
grievance committee that also investigates alleged violations. The local grievance committee deter-
mines whether sufficient evidence exists to charge an attorney with a disciplinary violation. If suffi-
cient evidence does exist, a formal complaint is filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievance
and Discipline for hearing. The Board consists of seventeen members from the Ohio bar appointed
to serve for three years. A panel consisting of three board members hears each complaint and deter-
mines if there is sufficient evidence for a referral to the full board. A referral will include the panel's
findings of facts and recommendations with respect to a public reprimand, suspension, or disbar-
ment. The full board then hears and rules on disciplinary matters referred to it by the panel, and if
the complaint is not dismissed, its findings are filed with the clerk of court. The attorney then has
the opportunity to appear before the Ohio Supreme Court and show cause why the findings should
not be confirmed and the disciplinary order not entered. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately is
responsible for any punishment. OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
BAR OF OHIO V (Page 1983).
27. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2273.
28. Id.
29. The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2274. The panel that originally heard the case, see supra note 26,
only recommended that Zauderer receive a public reprimand. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2274.
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court also concluded that Zauderer's infractions merited a public reprimand. 31
The United States Supreme Court examined the Dalkon Shield advertise-
ment and found that it was neither false nor deceptive. Therefore, the advertise-
ment deserved the limited protection of the first amendment's commercial
speech doctrine.3 2 The Court began its inquiry by adopting the test of Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,33 which requires that
a regulation of commercial speech directly advance a substantial state interest
and be no more extensive than necessary. 34 The Court searched for a substantial
state interest in prohibiting Zauderer's Dalkon Shield advertisement and found
none. Concerns about overreaching and invasion of privacy-the bases for pro-
hibition of in-person solicitation by attorneys-were not justified in the context
of printed advertisements. Advertisements, said the Court, do not have the
same force as a trained advocate nor are they likely to create pressure for an
immediate answer.35 The fact advertising would encourage litigation did not
justify the legislation, said the Court. 36 The Court also observed that the possi-
bility of attorneys filing meritless claims did not give the state the right to ban
advertising that contained advice.37 The Court refused to recognize litigation
itself as an evil, and indicated that the public should be made aware of their legal
rights. 38 Because Ohio did not have an interest at stake strong enough to over-
come the constitutional protection of commercial free speech, 39 the Court held
that printed advertisements which solicit business by giving legal advice and
contain truthful, nondeceptive information are protected under the first
amendment.4o
31. Id. at 2274.
32. Id. at 2276.
33. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson the Supreme Court established the level of first
amendment protection currently afforded commercial speech. The Central Hudson test is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
34. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275.
35. Id. at 2277.
36. "The state is not entitled to interfere with... access [to the courts] by denying its citizens
accurate information about their legal rights." Id. at 2278.
There has been both public outcry, see Gest, Solorzano, Shapiro & Doan, "See You in Court:"
Our Suing Society, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 20, 1982, at 58; Stone, Our Hungry Lawyers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1978, at 116, and scholarly debate over the issue of our
litigious society. The major complaints raised by scholars include extensive case backlogs, massive
percentage increase in the number of suits filed, and filing of frivolous claims. See Galanter, Reading
the Landscapes of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 61-66 (1983). Other scholars have
severely criticized the anti-litigation viewpoint. These critics claim that publicized statistics focus
solely on the appellate level and that statistics at the trial level do not bear out anti-litigation hypoth-
eses. See, e.g., id. at 61-62. Further, pro-litigation critics argue that there has been no scholarly
development of over-litigation arguments. Anti-litigation scholars are accused of echoing identical
arguments, cross-citing each other, and duplicating the same examples of abuse in the legal system.
See, e.g., id. at 64.
For a view of the increase in litigation from an historical perspective, see L. FRIEDMAN, AMER-
ICAN LAW 280-90 (1984).
37. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278.
38. Id. at 2277-78. "The State is not entitled to interfere with access [to the courts] by denying
its citizens accurate information about their legal rights." Id. at 2278.
39. Id. at 2280.
40. Id.
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The eight justices who heard the case4 ' agreed that illustrations also were
entitled to protection under the commercial speech doctrine and applied the
Central Hudson test to the drawing in the Dalkon Shield advertisement. Ohio's
sole interest in prohibiting illustrations was in preserving dignity in the legal
profession and the Court found this interest insufficient to abridge first amend-
ment rights.4 2
The Court next considered whether Zauderer could be disciplined for fail-
ing to disclose in the Dalkon Shield advertisement that clients whose cases were
handled on a contingent fee basis would be liable for significant litigation costs
regardless of the results of their suits and that clients who answered the drunk
driving advertisement could owe attorney's fees if convicted of a lesser charge.
The majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's partial concurrence agreed that
Ohio could require the disclosure of this information. The majority reasoned
that because first amendment protection rested on the consumer's right to re-
ceive information, the speaker had only a minimal first amendment interest in
not providing particular information. 43 For this reason, traditional first amend-
ment doctrine in the area of compelled speech did not apply.44 The majority
explained that some first amendment protection against compelled speech in the
commercial speech context did exist: unjustified or unduly burdensome disclo-
sure requirements would offend the first amendment. "But we hold that an ad-
vertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers."
45
Justice Brennan, in his partial dissent, took issue with this "reasonable rela-
tionship" test for compelled speech in the commercial speech context.4 6 Bren-
nan contended that this test stripped away first amendment protection
guaranteed by Central Hudson's intermediate level of scrutiny and argued that
the Central Hudson test should apply to compelled speech.47
41. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. Id. at 2284.
42. Id. at 2280-81. Ohio also argued that the difficulty of policing illustrations justified a pro-
phylactic ban. The Court noted that the Federal Trade Commission had been identifying and sup-
pressing visually deceptive advertisements and there was no reason why Ohio could not do likewise.
Id.
43. The advertiser's speech is protected largely because advertisers need a financial incentive to
disseminate information to the consumer. First amendment protection of commercial speech hinges
on the consumer's right to information. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
44. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2285-87 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Justice Brennan found it equally troubling that the state never clearly articulated the infor-
mation that it required be disclosed. The Dalkon Shield advertisement was not misleading enough
to justify punishment absent a clear statement of required disclosures by state disciplinary rules. Id.
at 2289-90 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Several other states had ap-
proved Dalkon Shield advertisements containing the identical statement concerning contingent fees.
Id. at 2291 & n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Subjecting advertising to
vague requirements chilled speech and thus violated the first amendment, he argued, and forced
attorneys to advertise at their own peril. Id. at 2289-90 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). If an attorney had omitted some information and the state subsequently created an
interest reasonably related to preventing deception that required the omitted information be in-
cluded, then the advertiser would be punished without knowledge of or intent to commit the alleged
wrong. And the consequences of guessing wrong would be severe. Although Zauderer received only
1986]
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Commentators historically have debated whether any first amendment pro-
tection should extend to commercial speech.4 8 Early Supreme Court cases gen-
erally discounted contentions that commercial speech merited protection.49 The
seminal case on this issue is Valentine v. Chrestensen,50 in which the Court re-
fused to strike down an ordinance that denied advertisers the right to distribute
handbills in public. The Court was convinced "that the Constitution imposes no
such restraint [as is imposed with political speech 51] on government as respects
purely commercial advertising."'52 The Court did not articulate its reasons for
denying first amendment protection to commercial speech, but commentators
a public reprimand, this discipline made him vulnerable to disbarment if he committed a second
violation of any kind. Id. at 2291-92 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Public
discipline sullies an attorney's reputation, and more severe punishment can deprive the attorney of
his or her livelihood. Justice Brennan argued that the gamble an advertiser faces creates a "potential
trap for an unwary attorney acting in good faith ... [and] imposes an intolerable chill upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. at 2292 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
In addition to first amendment implications, the state's failure to specify the required disclo-
sures raised procedural due process concerns. Zauderer could have no notice of a rule that was not
clearly explicated prior to his disciplinary hearing. The due process clause was implicated in the
adjudication of deception involving the drunk driving advertisement. The Committee had found this
advertisement misleading and deceptive on a ground different from that charged in the original
complaint. This change in theories deprived Zauderer of reasonable notice of the specific charges he
had to meet. Id. at 2289-93 (Brennan, L, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority,
however, ruled that a change in theories did not deny Zauderer notice of the situation out of which
the complaint arose. Rather, the majority found that general notice of the charges against him was
sufficient in this case to satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 2283-84.
48. The Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. Many judges and commentators have theorized about what
speech this constitutional language protects. Alexander Meiklejohn puts forth the most restrictive
view of the kinds of speech protected by the first amendment. In his view, only "public" speech
deserves constitutional protection. Public speech consists of speech connected to public issues or to
self-government and would not include commercial speech. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26-28 (1960). What Meiklejohn terms pub-
lic speech can also be termed political speech. See infra note 51.
Thomas Emerson takes a more moderate view and distills speech into four functions: (1) a way
to ensure self-fulfillment to individual members of a society, (2) a means to develop knowledge and
to discover truth, (3) a method of providing individuals with a means of influencing decision-making,
and (4) a way of balancing change and stability in society. In Emerson's view speech that falls under
any one of these four categories merits first amendment protection. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963). It is unclear whether commercial
speech would merit protection under Emerson's view. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1109 n.3 (10th ed. 1980).
The most liberal view was espoused by Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes, who believed that all
speech was important as an end in itself, stated that the proper way to control speech was to allow it
to control itself in the marketplace of ideas. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Under Holmes' view commercial speech clearly would deserve protection.
49. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (upholding ordinance banning door-
to-door commercial solicitation); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141-42 & n.1, 149 (1943)
(suggesting state may prohibit door-to-door distribution of commercial matter but not material of a
political or religious nature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-111 (1943) (noting differ-
ent treatment of religious and commercial material under the first amendment); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (commercial leaflets not protected by first amendment); Fifth Ave. Coach
Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467, 477 (1911) (upholding state ban on "advertising trucks, vans
or wagons").
50. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
51. Political speech consists of speech that is connected to public issues or self-government.
That the first amendment protects speech of this type is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting political speech of Ku Klux Klan leader).
52. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
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have formulated at least two theories to explain the Court's holding in Valentine.
First, commercial speech does not enhance individual growth through matters
of belief and expression; the interests of the speaker and the listener are merely
economic. 53 Second, failure to protect commercial speech does not harm polit-
ical speech because commercial speech contains no expression essential to self-
government. 54 The value of commercial speech is its usefulness in assisting con-
sumers decide when and from whom to purchase products or services. Thus, the
value of commercial speech is in continuing the market economy.55
For more than three decades the Supreme Court excluded commercial
speech from first amendment protection.56 Therefore, when the Supreme Court
in 1976 faced a first amendment challenge to a state ban on advertising, the
result seemed certain. However, the Court broke three decades of precedent and
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council5 7
recognized first amendment protection for commercial speech. 58 The Virginia
statute at issue banned price advertising by pharmacists. 59 The Court found the
statute offensive to the first amendment and held that a state may not completely
suppress dissemination of truthful information about a lawful activity. 60 The
Court characterized the speech at issue as "I will sell you the X prescription
drug at the Y price" 6 1 and stated that even this basic market transaction de-
served first amendment protection. A major reason for granting protection to
commercial speech was "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information." 62 Such information, the Court observed, is vital in
the preservation of a market economy:
53. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1979).
54. Id. at 15.
55. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
760-63 (1976) (noting the value of advertising in both the market of products and services and in the
marketplace of ideas).
56. From Valentine, 316 U.S. 52, discussed supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text, to Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), discussed
infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text, the Court consistently denied protection to pure commer-
cial speech.
57. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
58. This recognition was not entirely unexpected. Several previous cases had indicated the
Court's willingness to afford first amendment protection to commercial speech and thereby break
existing precedent. In 1964 the Court ruled in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
that commercial motivation did not preclude first amendment protection from a political advertise-
ment. In 1975 the Court held that state prohibition of an advertisement in a Virginia newspaper that
advised Virginia residents of the availability of abortions in New York violated the first amendment.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 722-24 (1982).
59. The statute provided:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who... (3) publishes,
advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount,
price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs
containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974) (amended 1980).
60. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id. at 763.
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So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensible.
63
After establishing that the speech merited protection because of the con-
sumer's need for information, the Court analyzed Virginia's justifications for the
ban. The Court recognized a strong state interest in promoting professionalism,
but ruled that regulation of pharmacists, not their advertising, was the appropri-
ate way to advance this interest. 64 The Court termed Virginia's approach
"highly paternalistic" and stated:
[The] alternative [to Virginia's approach] is to assume that this infor-
mation is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing prevents the "pro-
fessional" pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior
product, and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume pre-
scription drug retailer. But the choice among these alternative ap-
proaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It is
precisely this kind of choice, between dangers of suppressing informa-
tion, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us.65
The Court structured its opinion as if it were balancing state interests
against the value of commercial speech, but it adopted what appeared to be a
strict scrutiny standard. 66 Simply put, truthful information could not be sup-
pressed completely. Despite this strict scrutiny language, the Court recognized
that "common-sense" differences existed between commercial speech and polit-
ical speech. These differences justified a lesser degree of protection for commer-
cial speech.67 Some commentators nevertheless believed that full first
amendment protection for commercial speech followed from the strict scrutiny
standard employed in Virginia Pharmacy regardless of these common-sense dif-
ferences. 68 Cases that followed Virginia Pharmacy also seemed to indicate that
commercial speech would be afforded full first amendment protection. Of these
cases, Bates v. State Bar69 was the first in which the Court considdred first
63. Id. at 765.
64. Id. at 770.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. The differences that the Court noted were: (1) commercial speakers can verify their infor-
mation more easily than other speakers; (2) the information may be more durable and less likely to
be chilled by regulation because advertising is crucial in a market economy; (3) affirmative require-
ments such as warnings, disclaimers, or additional information might be required to prevent decep-
tion. Id. at 771 & n.24.
68. In 1978, for example, Professor Laurence H. Tribe noted that "[t]ruthful statements which
are neither misleading nor obscene are protected by the first amendment even though made for a
commercial purpose." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663 n.51 (1978) (quoted in
Note, supra note 58, at 727).
69. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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amendment protection for attorney advertising.70
In Bates the Court held that advertising by attorneys could not be subject to
blanket suppression. 71 The advertisement in question contained entirely truth-
ful, fixed prices for routine legal services. 72 The interest at stake in this adver-
tisement, said the Court, was the consumer's need to have the information the
ad conveyed 73 to make an informed decision about hiring an attorney.74 This
information, which could have increased utilization of the legal system, might
have been unavailable to the consumer through other channels. 75
The Court rejected each of the State's asserted justifications for the ban on
attorney advertising. The Court first observed that a ban on advertising was an
ineffective method of promoting quality legal services.7 6 The State argued that
advertising would detract from professionalism among attorneys and would lead
to public distrust of the profession. The Court rejected this argument and found
the nexus between professionalism and advertising "severely strained."'77 In-
deed, the Court saw advertising as a means of reducing public hostility toward
lawyers by informing the public that legal services are affordable. 78 The Court
found that the benefits of advertising outweighed the perhaps undesirable effect
of increasing litigation. 79 The Court also rejected the notion that attorney ad-
vertising was inherently misleading.80 Fixed price advertising, said the Court,
probably would not and could not be done in cases involving unique or highly
individualized services. 81 The fact advertising provided an incomplete basis for
selecting an attorney supported the state's argument, but did not justify a sup-
pression of speech: "It seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that
the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed
to reach an informed decision."'8 2 As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court found
70. Two cases involving commercial speech were decided prior to Bates. In Linmark Assoc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court ruled on first amendment grounds that a
ban on "For Sale" and "Sold" signs was an impermissible method of achieving the laudable objective
of racial integration. In Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court found that a
ban on advertisements of contraceptives was an unconstitutional infringement of the right to privacy,
id. at 687-88, and the commercial speech protection of the first amendment, id. at 700. See Note,
supra note 58, at 726-27.
71. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
72. The services advertised were an uncontested divorce, a simple will, an adoption, a simple
personal bankruptcy, and a name change. Id. at 385.
73. The Court could refuse to hear cases brought by attorney advertisers on the basis of a lack
of standing to sue because advertisers assert the rights of consumers, not their own rights. The
Court has never addressed this issue and probably never will. That the Court ignores the standing
issue comports with the notion that standing is merely a docket control device. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bar-
low v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting).
74. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
75. See id. at 375-77.
76. Id. at 378-79.
77. Id. at 368.
78. Id. at 368-72.
79. Id. at 375-77.
80. Id. at 372.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 374.
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that the effects of competition would offset any increase in costs from advertising
and thus the state could not justify an advertising ban on grounds of undesirable
economic effects. 83 Finally, the Court was not convinced that problems sur-
rounding the enforcement of less restrictive regulations were severe enough to
justify an outright ban on advertising.84
The Court in Bates, however, did recognize that legal advertising differed
from general advertising and thus was subject to more restrictive regulation.85
Misstatements that might be insignificant in other contexts could be significant
in legal advertising. Statements about the quality of services that cannot be veri-
fied and in-person solicitation could be prohibited.8 6 In addition, the Court sug-
gested that the state might require that supplemental information-a warning or
limited disclaimer-be included in an advertisement. 87
The Court's decision in Bates failed to answer fully attorneys' questions
about the extent of protection afforded attorney advertising under the first
amendment. Two 1978 cases, both involving solicitation,88 gave the Court an
opportunity to address these questions. In the first, In re Primus,8 9 the Court
held that a state could not ban in-person solicitation by an attorney for political
or social purposes when economic gain was not a motive. Thus, under Primus,
if the predominant motive behind an advertisement is within the area protected
as political speech, the advertisement will be afforded full first amendment
protection.9"
When the motive for in-person solicitation is personal profit rather than
political or social change, the Court has denied first amendment protection. In
83. Id. at 377-78.
84. Id. at 379. Opponents of advertising and solicitation argued that complete prohibition of all
advertising promotes professionalism by maintaining esprit de corps, increasing public esteem (be-
cause advertising suggests that money is the prime motivation of lawyers), and preventing consumer
selection of an attorney for the wrong reasons (low price rather than skill level). An advertising ban
theoretically limits the business available to dishonest or incompetent attorneys because without
advertising attorneys must depend on referrals based on their reputation. Dissatisfied consumers
will not refer others to a dishonest or incompetent attorney. See, eg., Brief of State Bar of Arizona
at 23, Bates; Brief of the State Bar of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae in Support of the State Bar
of Arizona at 11, 14, Bates; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677,
684 (1954); Cappo, Lawyers Seem Naive About Advertising Use, Chicago Daily News, Dec. 9, 1975,
at 30, col. 1; Cappo, Lawyers Advertise? Watch Out McBarrister, Chicago Daily News, June 3, 1975,
at 28, col. 1. The Bates court noted that "the postulated connection between advertising and true
professionalism ... presumes that attorneys must conceal.., the real-life fact that lawyers earn their
livelihood" by practicing law. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
85. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 & n.37.
86. Id. at 383-84.
87. Id. at 384.
88. In this context solicitation means to recommend one's self for employment. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981). Because solicitation is but a subcat-
egory of advertising, see supra note 1, the commercial speech doctrine should apply in cases of
solicitation in the same manner as in the more general advertising cases.
89. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The attorney, an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) representa-
tive, sought to recruit plaintiffs who had been sterilized wrongfully and who would file suit against
the parties involved. The attorney was disciplined for writing a letter offering representation at no
cost to a woman who was a possible plaintiff. Id. at 416 & n.6. The ACLU was to receive no fee for
representing these plaintiffs. Id. at 422.
90. Id. at 424-32.
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Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association9 1 the Supreme Court held that a state
could ban in-person solicitation by attorneys for profit. The Court recognized
the potential dangers consumers faced from door-to-door lawyers.92 The lawyer
could invade the consumer's privacy. The soliciting lawyer could also exert
pressure on the client to hire him or her, demand an immediate response without
opportunity for consumer comparison or reflection, and even discourage con-
sumer investigation of other attorneys.93 The Court further recognized that reg-
ulation of in-person solicitation would be difficult. 94 An attorney allowed to
solicit unchecked might subordinate a client's best interests to the best interests
of the attorney's bank account. 95 The Court's decision in Ohralik thus applied a
prophylactic ban to one type of commercial speech, signalling a departure from
what had appeared to be full first amendment protection for commercial
speech.96
The process of chipping away at first amendment protection of commercial
speech continued in CentralHudson. In CentralHudson the Court established a
three part test to determine whether a regulation restricting commercial speech
was valid.97 The Court held that the regulation must (1) advance a substantial
government interest, (2) directly advance the interest asserted, and (3) be no
more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.98 Applying this test to a ban
on promotional advertising by electric utilities, the Court held that the ban did
not satisfy the third element of the test. The ban suppressed speech that in no
way impaired the state interest at issue.99 This overly expansive ban "[reduced]
the information available for consumer decisions and thereby [defeated] the pur-
pose of the First Amendment." 1°
Some commentators claimed that Central Hudson broadened protection for
commercial speech by setting up a least restrictive means analysis under which
one need only find a slightly less drastic alternative to prove unconstitutional-
ity.101 These commentators, however, were proved wrong by subsequent deci-
91. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The attorney, Ohralik, had heard about an automobile accident that
resulted in serious injury to two young women. Ohralik raced to the hospital and convinced one of
the women, who was then in traction, to sign a contract employing him as her attorney. Id. at 450.
He later convinced the second woman to employ him after visiting her at her home. Id. at 451.
When both women later fired Ohralik he refused to allow himself to be dismissed and instituted a
breach of contract action against his clients. Id. at 451-52 & n.5.
92. Id. at 457-58.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 461 n.19.
96. A year later the Court upheld a state ban on the use of trade names by optometrists on
grounds that trade names had a great potential to mislead. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1979).
97. To qualify for protection, the speech must fall within the scope of the commercial speech
doctrine. The speech must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading and must not propose
an illegal transaction. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 563-64.
98. Id. at 566.
99. Id. at 569-70.
100. Id. at 567.
101. See Note, supra note 58, at 729-30; Note, Legislative Choice and Commercial Speech: Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 1981 UTAH L. REV. 831, 831-40; Note, Electric & Gas Utility
Advertising: The First Amendment Legacy of Central Hudson, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 493-94 (1982).
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sions. 10 2 In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,10 3 decided in 1981, the Court
struck down a billboard restriction on grounds of excessive interference with
noncommercial speech.'1 4 The Court stated that the ban would have been valid
had it affected only commercial speech.10 5 The Court, albeit in dicta, employed
deferential scrutiny in applying the Central Hudson test.10 6
In 1982 the Court applied this intermediate level of scrutiny to attorney
advertising. In re R.MJ. 0 7 posed the question whether an attorney could be
limited to a list of categories when describing his or her area of practice in an
advertisement.10 8 The Court found that the restriction served no substantial
state interest and granted protection to an attorney whose advertised description
of practice deviated from the list.10 9 The advertising attorney also faced charges
that he had mailed announcements to persons other than "lawyers, clients, for-
mer clients, friends and relatives" 110 in violation of a disciplinary rule. The
Court found the justifications offered by the state superficial and stated that a
less restrictive path could have been taken to supervise the content of mail-
ings.I 1 ' The Court thus applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the prophy-
lactic ban and held that first amendment considerations controlled.1 12
Nonetheless, the Court in R.MJ. found that the special risks of deception
inherent in legal advertising justified regulations that might violate the first
amendment if applied to other types of advertising. The Court reemphasized
that states could regulate claims of quality because they were likely to mislead as
a category.1 3 A state, suggested the Court, could restrict in-person solicitation
and could require that a warning or disclaimer be included in advertisements.114
The bar could define services characterized as "routine," and the Court added
that price advertising of nonroutine legal services might evoke a judicial re-
sponse different from that in Bates.115 Clearly, the state could regulate inher-
ently misleading advertising or advertising that had actually misled
consumers.116
102. Proven right, however, was Justice Blackmun in his Central Hudson concurrence. Black-
mun argued that the Central Hudson test reduced the protection that had been provided to commer-
cial speech in previous cases. He stated that "this level of intermediate scrutiny [was inappropriate]
when a state seeks to suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private eco-
nomic decision that the state cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly." Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
104. Id. at 512-17.
105. Id. at 512.
106. Id. at 507-12.
107. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
108, Id. at 195 n.6. The list is no longer included in the current MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1981).
109. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207.
110. Id. at 206.
I11. Id.
112. Id. at 206-07.
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 200 & n.ll.
116. Id. at 202.
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Although the risk of deception justified some regulation of advertising, a
later case dismissed potential offense to the consumer as a legitimate rationale
for regulation. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 117 the Supreme Court
struck down a federal statute118 that prohibited an advertiser from mailing un-
solicited advertisements for contraceptives. Potential offensiveness was of no
concern to the Court because the consumer could avoid contact with the infor-
mation by having his or her name removed from the company's mailing list
pursuant to, the statute or the consumer could discard the material. 19
Recently, the Supreme Court even further narrowed the protection afforded
commercial speech by the first amendment. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associ-
ates v. Tourism Co. 120 the Supreme Court refused to strike down a Puerto Rico
statute that prohibited advertisements inviting Puerto Ricans to visit local casi-
nos. 121 The Puerto Rico Superior Court had interpreted the statute to allow
local advertising by casinos so long as "the object of the advertisement is the
tourist."' 122 The Supreme Court majority applied the Central Hudson test and
found that this limitation on advertising was the Puerto Rico Legislature's
means of reducing local demand for casinos. The limitation thus was intended
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 12 3 The majority based
its decision on the states' power to prohibit completely gambling by its own
citizens.124 The majority ignored the problem posed by such "back-door regula-
tion" through advertising restrictions, 2 5 and ignored the position taken in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy that information alone is not harmful. 126
The question arises to what extent advertisers can be compelled to include
specific information in an advertisement. In Bates the Court suggested that sup-
plemental information-a warning or limited disclaimer-could be an appropri-
ate alternative to blanket suppression of attorney advertising. 12 7 In R.MJ. the
Court repeated its statement that a state could require inclusion of a warning or
disclaimer in an advertisement. The Court, however, did not explore the impli-
cations of compelled speech' 28 on current first amendment doctrine. The issue
117. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
118. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1982).
119. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72. The company produced condoms. Not all of the pamphlets at issue
attempted to sell the company's "Trojan" brand directly. Some of the pamphlets discussed the
generic condom. These informational pamphlets presented a close question whether the material fell
within the commercial speech doctrine or deserved protection as core first amendment speech. Id. at
66-67 & nn.12-14. The Court concluded that the pamphlets were commercial speech and were enti-
tled to the qualified protection of the commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 68.
120. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
121. Id. at 2972.
122. Id. at 2974.
123. Id. at 2976-78.
124. Id. at 2979.
125. The dissenters, however, did recognize the dimensions of this problem. See id. at 2980
(Brennan, J., dissenting), 2986 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy, see supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
127. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
128. Compelled speech is speech that a speaker is forced to utter or print. The first amendment
protects both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking. See infra notes 129-33 and
accompanying text.
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of compelled speech was not litigated in either Bates or R.MJ. 129 In addition,
the Court's suggestions in Bates and R.MJ. did not indicate what level of scru-
tiny applied to compelled speech in commercial speech cases.
Although doubt existed in the commercial speech context, the Court had
made it clear that a state cannot compel a person to speak either verbally or
symbolically in the noncommercial context. A schoolchild cannot be forced to
recite the pledge of allegiance;' 30 a newspaper cannot be forced to print a reply
to editorial statements free of charge;13 ' and an automobile owner cannot be
compelled to display the slogan "Live Free or Die" on a license plate when the
owner objects to that slogan on moral, religious, or political grounds. 132 These
three cases illustrate expansive protection of core first amendment speech
against regulations that compel specific statements. Because the Court affords a
lesser degree of protection to commercial speech generally, it was initially un-
clear whether the rules concerning compelled core first amendment speech
would apply to compelled commercial speech. The Supreme Court in Zauderer
for the first time directly addressed the constitutionality of compelled speech as
part of a state's regulation of commercial speech, and held that compelled
speech regulations need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. 133
The intermediate level of scrutiny for commercial speech reaffirmed in
Zauderer is an understandable result of the Court's ambiguity toward commer-
cial speech.1 34 Protection of commercial speech stems from recognition that for
a market economy to function, much less function efficiently, information must
be available to consumers. The consumer must know where goods and services
can be purchased at affordable prices. 135 Information enhances competition
129. The attorney in R.M.J. had been charged with failure to include a required disclaimer of
expertise in a listed area, but the state admitted that the discipline administered was not based on a
failure to include the disclaimer. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 197, 204-05 n.18. The court suggested in
R.M.J. that a disclaimer or explanation would be a way to "assure that the consumer is not misled."
Id. at 200 n. Il (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
130. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
131. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
132. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
133. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
134. One explanation for the Court's reluctance to provide workable guidelines is concern that
the Court would be moving into economic regulation if it did more in this area. Current doctrine
indicates that this is not an appropriate role for the Court. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963) (nonlawyers can be prohibited from debt-adjusting); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955) (opticians can be restricted from fitting glasses into frames without a prescription).
This was not always the law. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state cannot interfere
with employment contract when there is no reasonable ground for the exercise of the state's police
power); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state cannot interfere with employment contract
when there is no reasonable ground for the exercise of the state's police power).
135. The first amendment protects the consumer's right to receive information, rather than the
commercial speaker's desire to speak. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562; Bates, 433 U.S. at 364;
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. The protection granted in R.M.J. is consistent with this idea.
Consumers did not understand the meaning of the terms that the regulation required. The attorney
used language that was clearer to the consumer. This fact is made evident by comparing the terms
the state required, R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 195 n.6, with the terms the attorney actually used, id. at 196-
97 & n.8. The attorney's interest in disseminating information is important only as a means to
provide information to the consumer. Justice Brennan, however, suggested in Zauderer that the first
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which, in turn, lowers prices. 136
However, not all speech provides information that assists in consumer deci-
sion-making. Information that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive
harms the consumer. 137 Even truthful information can be used to harm the
consumer. 13 8 An intermediate level of scrutiny allows a court to weed out
harmful advertisements or methods of advertising from the helpful advertise-
ments or methods. This intermediate level allows the court to weigh competing
interests in a way that a bright line rule cannot. 139 It also allows the Court to
deal with technological change in an area prone to rapid advancement.
The Court's application of intermediate scrutiny to attorney advertising,
however, has created severe problems that threaten to undermine first amend-
ment protection for this type of commercial speech. 140 The Court has narrowly
amendment protects the commercial speaker's right to speak. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2292 n.17
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court could limit first amendment protection to advertising and solicitation that communi-
cates information which a consumer could use in making decisions. Advertising and solicitation that
does not provide useful information does not aid consumers in making choices and, therefore, gener-
ally should not be granted first amendment protection. Some amount of such information should be
protected because it serves to differentiate advertising and thus would encourage the advertiser to
disseminate the information. This additional requirement could be dealt with under an intermediate
scrutiny standard. Distinguishing "informational" from "noninformational" advertising and solici-
tation, however, would be difficult. It would be necessary to judge each advertisement on an ad hoe
basis. This approach would not give advertisers a clear notion of what is protected content in an
advertisement. The problems created under this approach would be identical to those created by the
use of intermediate scrutiny to protect commercial speech. See infra text accompanying notes 140-
77. Realistically, one would expect regulations that defined two ends of the spectrum and that ap-
proached the middle area with liberality. A rule that examined the predominant content of the
advertisement would operate in much the way that the commercial speech intermediate scrutiny test
operates. A motive test would be inapplicable because the motive for all advertising is profit.
136. In Bates the court stated:
[A]dvertising does increase an attorneys overhead costs, and... may increase substantially
the demand for services. Both these factors will tend to increase the price of legal services.
On the other hand, the tendency of advertising to enhance competition might.., produce
pressures on attorneys to reduce fees. The net effect of these competing influences is hard
to estimate. We deem it significant, however, that consumer organizations have filed briefs
as amic urging that the restriction on advertising be lifted. And we note as well that...
competition through advertising is ordinarily the desired norm.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 377-78 n.35.
137. There are controls on harmful information that occur naturally in the market. Consumers
are knowledgeable and intelligent and they gather information to make decisions. A seller faces a
high cost if he or she maintains a reputation for dishonesty and competitors call to the attention of
consumers the false claims made by the seller. Furthermore, private law remedies sounding in tort
and contract are available to aggrieved consumers. R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY
THE FTC 5-7 (1973).
138. This is the fundamental premise underlying the decision in Ohralik. See supra text accom-
panying notes 91-96.
139. The Court in Bates could have announced a bright line test that an attorney could advertise
fixed prices for routine legal services only. Such a rule would ignore that fixed prices for nonroutine
services might be appropriate in some instances. Such a situation might occur when an attorney
seeks to represent plaintiffs in similar circumstances-such as in the Dalkon Shield cases. An attor-
ney who has handled a large number of cases of this type is likely to know his or her approximate
expenses in preparing such a case. Although this approach poses the danger that an attorney might
opt for a financially beneficial result rather than a result that is in the client's best interest, the danger
might be less than the benefit to the consumer of the fixed fee compared with the cost of a contingent
fee. A bright line test would prohibit such advertising, while intermediate scrutiny would afford a
court the opportunity to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.
140. For an in-depth study of attorney advertising and its effect on the market, see FEDERAL
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tailored its decision in each of the attorney advertising and solicitation cases to
fit only the facts of the case and thereby it has offered virtually no guidance to
attorneys who wish to advertise or otherwise solicit business.' 41
To date, efforts of disciplinary rulemakers directed toward attorney adver-
tising and solicitation have been attempts to discourage these practices. Tradi-
tionally, there has been strong sentiment among members of the bar that
attorney advertising is inherently wrong.' 42 One notable opponent is former
TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR RE-
MOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING (1984) (cited in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279
n.13) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]. This staff report concludes that current rules are too re-
strictive and should be relaxed. Id. at 172. The methodology of this study has been criticized by the
executive director of the Michigan State Bar, Michael Franck. Franck argues that the data does not
support the study's conclusion. The FTC, of course, disagrees. ABA Conference Focuses on Trends
in Lawyer Advertising, 1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 813, 814 (1985).
141. The following examples illustrate questions left unanswered by the Court's commercial
speech decisions to date:
1. Contact with Sophisticated Consumers. A labor attorney wishes to solicit business in-person
and for personal profit from corporations known to have small legal staffs and large labor problems.
Can that attorney do so? The dangers of overreaching and undue influence that justified the Chralik
decision are absent when the consumer solicited is knowledgeable. Therefore, under the balancing
test of intermediate scrutiny the attorney's solicitation arguably is protected.
Attorney X, who successfully defends personal injury suits, wishes to place in a newspaper an
advertisement that reads "four out of five insurers sued in City A recommend using Firm X." This
statement is entirely true. The Court in Bates and R.MJ. has suggested that a statement in legal
advertising that cannot be verified may be barred, but if the statement can be verified and the con-
sumer is far less susceptible than the layperson, the flexible standard protecting commercial speech
ought to protect this statement as well.
Both of these examples currently are prohibited under disciplinary rules. See infra text accom-
panying notes 157-59.
2. Endorsements By Celebrities. A familiar advertising tactic is to have a popular sports figure
or other celebrity promote a product. Suppose Attorney X hired a celebrity to appear on television
and in magazines stating "Attorney X can handle all of your general legal needs. Come see X at her
office if you need legal advice." Can the state bar such conduct? The purpose of protecting commer-
cial speech is to ensure that market information reaches consumers. Using a celebrity does not
convey this vital information and, therefore, arguably could be barred without offending the first
amendment. Existing disciplinary rules do not address this issue. Cf infra notes 143-44 and accom-
panying text (giving Chief Justice Burger's view of "flagrant" advertising).
3. Enticing Consumers with Free Gifts. Suppose that Attorney X, thwarted in the two earlier
attempts, now places in a newspaper an advertisement that offers "one free car wash and wax with
each visit to Firm X." Can the state prohibit this advertisement? The advertisement contains mar-
ket information (price is reduced by value of the wash and wax to consumer), but this tactic relegates
the profession to the status of a product on a grocery store shelf. The first amendment value of the
information contained in the advertisements presented in Bates and R.M.. outweighed the state's
interest in professionalism, but neither Bates nor R.M.J. eliminated professionalism as a legitimate,
protectable interest. The advertising in this example all but destroys professionalism. The informa-
tion in the advertisement is not "true" price information such as fixed prices for routine services,
sliding scale fee arrangements, or an offer of a free consultation. Arguably, professionalism in this
case is more important than the information conveyed in X's advertisement. However, unless one
could argue that the advertising is misleading, which is unlikely, this conduct is not prohibited under
current decisions on state regulation of lawyer advertising.
4. Advertising in Places Where Injured People Will Notice. Attorney X and City A Ambulance
Company enter into a contract that gives Attorney X space to advertise her personal injury practice
on the side of ambulances. Attorney X also places a generous supply of business cards in the receiv-
ing area of the Emergency Room. Can the state bar these practices? Arguably, these acts are
equivalent to prohibited direct mail solicitation and thus justify discipline-they reach particular
consumers with specific legal needs addressed in the advertising. This conclusion, however, is far
from clear. The state could prohibit such advertisements by enacting a valid time, place, and man-
ner restriction such as may be imposed on any speech protected under the first amendment.
142. 3 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 46.02 (1973).
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Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Addressing a meeting of the American Bar
Association in July of 1985, he claimed that "advertising in flagrant ways is
pulling down the image of the entire profession." 143 He stated that he would
"dig ditches" before resorting to "flagrant" advertising. 144 Perhaps these senti-
ments, which are shared by some others on the Court, 145 explain why the
Supreme Court has failed to establish general rules protecting attorney advertis-
ing or solicitation. The Court's insistence that its holdings fit precisely the facts
at issue, however, fuels the controversy among members of the bar over attorney
advertising. There is a push from members of the bar who disfavor all advertis-
ing for restrictive rules treading very near the boundaries set in the commercial
speech cases. As a result, attorneys who would otherwise advertise or solicit
business do not do so for fear of incurring the wrath of their fellow lawyers. 146
Supreme Court decisions prior to Zauderer established ends of the attorney
advertising spectrum. The Court in Bates and R.MJ. established that two iso-
lated advertisements disseminated in newsprint were permissible. The Ohralik
decision identified a method of advertising that was impermissible. 147 The
Zauderer case represents the Court's first venture into the grey area between
R.MJ. and Ohralik, and the decision in Zauderer is disappointing. The Court
143. Burger Assails Lawyer Advertising, The Washington Post, July 8, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
144. Id. at A6, col. 1. The Chief Justice was criticizing an advertisement showing a National
Football League star making a touchdown in the Super Bowl and then stating that if he were hurt he
would use a particular law firm. The local bar association criticized the advertisement but took no
disciplinary action against the firm. The firm took the advertisement off the air voluntarily. Id.
The Chief Justice's view against advertising also extends to less flagrant conduct. For example,
he dissented in In re Admission of Benton, 50 U.S.L.W. 3713 (1982), which involved an application
for admission to practice before the Supreme Court. Earlier in his legal career the applicant had
included an advertisement in a "Val-Pak." Val-Pak is a mail out package of coupons that provides
discounts on goods and services. Id. The applicant's advertisement stated that a first consultation
would cost $10. Id. The state supreme court disciplined the attorney for soliciting business at an
undefined discount. The United States Supreme Court denied the attorney's petition for certiorari
from the state supreme court decision. Not long after the petition was denied, the attorney filed an
application to practice before the Supreme Court and the Court admitted him to the Supreme Court
Bar. Id. at 3714. Burger's dissent characterized the attorney's advertisement as "shoddy profes-
sional practices" and stated that he would have denied the attorney's application to practice before
the Supreme Court. Id. at 3714 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
145. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist, partially concurred in
Zauderer, but argued that the likelihood of overreaching and undue influence justified a prophylactic
ban on advertisements giving legal advice. The removal of personal contact did not eliminate the
risks associated with solicitation, O'Connor argued. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2294 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Professionals have greater obligations than merchants,
she argued, and the difference between offering legal advice and offering merchandise for sale mer-
ited greater deference to the state. Id. at 2295. Legal advertising is dangerous, she contended, be-
cause it "[encourages] lawyers to present that advice most likely to bring potential clients into the
office." Id. at 2296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor used
the Central Hudson test and in her balancing found that the dangers of solicitation-any solicita-
tion-justified a prophylactic ban.
146. In 1978, an ABA poll showed that only 3% of the attorneys surveyed advertised. In 1979
that figure rose to 7%. L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING & SOLICI-
TATION 43 (1980). That pk rcentage moved to 10% in 1981 and to 13% in 1983. See FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 140, at 70.
147. The decision in Ohralik could have been a reaction to the outrageousness of the attorney's
conduct in that case. The attorney heard about the accident and, after obtaining the assent of the
accident victim's parents, approached the victim while she was still hospitalized and in traction.
Chralik, 436 U.S. at 450. Had the conduct been less offensive, the decision might have come out
differently.
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took only a tiny step beyond R.M.J.. An attorney who wishes to run an adver-
tisement that deviates from those ruled permissible in the case law faces a grave
risk. The attorney can present to the public what he or she reasonably believes is
an advertisement protected by the first amendment and suffer disciplinary action
if the guess is wrong. Advisory wings of disciplinary bodies have been of little
aid to attorneys who wish to advertise. Phillip Zauderer's situation provides an
example of the untenable situation in which attorneys who wish to advertise find
themselves. Zauderer took his advertisement to the Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel for approval, but the Office refused to advise him on whether the advertise-
ment might expose him to discipline.148 Zauderer then examined the case law
and made his best guess; a guess which ultimately resulted in discipline. 149 The
Court's refusal to establish workable guidelines chills advertising by placing
grave risks on attorney advertisers and, by inhibiting the flow of information,
harms the consumer. 150
Attorneys have failed to reach vast segments of the legal market. An esti-
mate of a Special Committee of the American Bar Association in 1977 indicated
that effective access to legal services is denied to seventy percent of the popula-
tion.151 Potential consumers are not people unable to pay legal fees; they do not
seek counsel because they erroneously believe that fees are unaffordable 152 or
because they have no way to select an attorney other than making a random
choice from the "yellow pages" of the telephone directory.' 53 One method to
reach those in need of legal assistance is through direct mail. In R.MJ. the
Court held that an attorney could mail announcements to the general public. 154
Direct mail solicitation is a step beyond R.MJ.; it is mailing information about a
specific legal problem to a consumer who the attorney knows has need of the
specific legal information that the attorney can provide. Commentators have
suggested that Zauderer indicates that direct mail solicitation is protected com-
mercial speech. 15 5 This suggestion has fueled a lively debate,' 56 and the dimen-
sions of the problems that flow from uncertainty in the area of attorney
advertising are evident in the direct mail solicitation issue.
148. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2289 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
Stewart, supra note 12, at 63.
149. Stewart, supra note 12, at 63.
150. An example of harm occurring to consumers is Gunn v. Washek, 405 Pa. 521, 522-25, 176
A.2d 635, 635-37 (1961) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), in which an insurance adjuster convinced the
mother of an injured five-year-old child to delay hiring an attorney. The statute of limitations ran
and the child collected nothing. Had the mother known of the limitations period the child might
well have been compensated. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
113 (1975).
151. Freedman, Advertising and Solicitations by Lawyers" Legal Ethics, "Commercial" Speech,
and Free Speech, in ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH 67, 68 (A. Hyman & M. Johnson ed. 1977).
152. Id.
153. One study reports that 83% of those interviewed agreed with the statement that people do
not go to lawyers because they have no way of knowing which attorneys are competent to handle
their problems. Anderson, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 967, 968.
154. For a discussion of R.M., see supra text accompanying notes 107-16.
155. Analysis, 1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 838-39 (1985).
156. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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An example illustrates the dilemma in the direct mail context. Suppose an
attorney discovers that a woman was injured by a Dalkon Shield. The attorney
realizes that the consumer probably does not know that she can recover damages
for her injuries. The attorney also realizes that the statute of limitations is run-
ning and that the consumer's claim will be barred unless suit is filed very soon.
The attorney is aware that he or she is almost certain to win this suit and collect
a fee. The attorney writes a letter to the consumer that reads:
Enclosed is a sketch of the Dalkon Shield. This device has been
alleged to have caused serious pelvic inflammations resulting in hospi-
talizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hysterectomies. It is also al-
leged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions,
miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-
term deliveries. Do not assume that it is too late to take legal action
against the Shield's manufacturer.
I am an attorney in town and am currently representing women in
such cases. The cases are handled on a contingent fee basis of the
amount recovered. You pay only the costs of litigation if you lose the
suit. If you win then a percentage of the fee (computation omitted)
goes to me after costs are paid.
If you have any questions, please call me for a free
consultation. 157
The consumer calls the attorney and requests representation. The attorney ac-
cepts employment and begins work on the case. Is the attorney subject to
discipline?
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility the answer clearly is
yes. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A) states that an attorney "shall not... recom-
mend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate
to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a law-
yer."158 The attorney in the above example has recommended that a layperson
employ the attorney, and by doing so has violated Disciplinary Rule 2-
103(A). 159 By accepting employment the attorney also has violated Disciplinary
Rule 2-103(E), which prohibits an attorney from accepting employment as a
result of prohibited conduct. 160
The attorney fares no better under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. Rule 7.3 states that "[a] lawyer may not solicit professional employment
from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior profes-
sional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."' 161 In the example,
despite the attorney's concern that the consumer's rights be vindicated, a signifi-
157. This language is identical to that used by the attorney in Zauderer, except that this letter
goes a step further and discloses the required information about the costs of litigation.
158. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981).
159. Nor would the result change if the consumer were a business executive and the lawyer were
writing to propose to do collections for the company. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1436 (1979).
160. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(E) (1981).
161. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
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cant motive for the action was the attorney's own economic interest. That mo-
tive is present with any advertiser and any method of advertising-such as direct
mail solicitation. As a result, the attorney is again subject to discipline.
That direct mail solicitation is prohibited under both the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is not
determinative. The crucial inquiry is whether prohibition of direct mail solicita-
tion by attorneys violates the Constitution. The letter itself is protectable com-
mercial speech because it is not false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading, nor
does it propose an illegal transaction. Whether protection is actually granted
depends on whether a ban of direct mail solicitation passes the intermediate
scrutiny of the Central Hudson test.162
To pass scrutiny under Central Hudson, the direct mail ban must (1) ad-
vance a substantial state interest, (2) directly advance the interest served, and (3)
be no more extensive than necessary. 163 Direct mail, just as any method of ad-
vertising, could be used by an unethical attorney to overreach or exercise undue
influence over a potential consumer. The court considered prevention of over-
reaching a substantial interest in Ohralilc 16 In the typical direct mail situation
the attorney contacts a vulnerable consumer. 165 The consumer has suffered
162. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text accompanying note 98.
164. Chralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
165. See In re Von Wiegan, 101 A.D.2d 627, 628, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148, modified, 63 N.Y.2d
163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), on remand, 485 N.Y.S.2d 399, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2701 (1985).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Von Wiegan after it handed down the Zauderer deci-
sion. This has resulted in much speculation about the implications of Zauderer on direct mail
prohibitions. In Von Wiegan an attorney had solicited clients through a direct mailing. The New
York court held that a state ban on direct mail solicitation violated the first amendment. Von Wie-
gan, 63 N.Y.2d at 175, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47. The attorney in Von Wiegan was
subject to discipline despite this holding because his direct mail advertisement was misleading and
deceptive. Id. at 175-76, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47. That the attorney would have been
punished regardless of the outcome of the direct mail issue could explain why the Supreme Court
refused to hear the case. The Court has likewise refused to hear cases in which discipline was im-
posed as a result of direct mail solicitation. See Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas, 270 Ark. 573,
607 S.W.2d 55 (1980) (attorneys included advertisement of $0 initial consultation fee in packet
containing discount coupons), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Herzog, 70
Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 (attorney sent letters to defendants listed in "Daily Court Re-
porter"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982). Compare Analysis, 1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 941-42 (1985) (Supreme Court will uphold ban on direct mail solicitation) with Analy-
sis, 1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 838-39 (1985) (Supreme Court's decision in
Zauderer and refusal to hear Von Wiegan indicate that ban on direct mail solicitation violates first
amendment).
Other courts recently have addressed the issue of direct mail advertising. See Adams v. Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 617 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (enjoining state from
enforcing prohibition of direct mail advertising on first amendment grounds); Spencer v. Honorable
Justices of Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (direct mail ban unconstitutional),
aff'd, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985); Leoni v. State Bar of Cal., 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 423 (1985) (in dicta, state cannot ban direct mail solicitation), appeal dismissed for want of
substantial federal question, 106 S. Ct. 1170 (1986); see also 1 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF.
CONDUCT MANUAL 801:4201-02 Op. 16 (1980 Maine opinion from The Professional Ethics Com-
mission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar stating that direct mail advertising to personal injury
victims may be permissible); 1 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT MANUAL 801:8304
Op. 414 (1984 Texas opinion from Professional Ethics Committee, State Bar of Texas, stating that
direct mail is permissible).
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some wrong that can be righted by an attorney, but the consumer may not real-
ize that someone other than the advertiser can handle the problem. Direct mail
solicitation may say just enough to entice a consumer into an attorney's office
voluntarily at which time the consumer may be subjected to the same treatment
that the Court found abhorrent in Ohralik. Conduct in an attorney's own office
is not subject to public scrutiny. But this is a danger faced by every consumer
who consults an attorney. Few people come to attorneys for a legal check-up. 166
Rather, clients come to attorneys when they have problems. The dangers from
direct mail solicitation are no greater and no less than those found elsewhere in
our legal system. In addition, the effect of a direct mailing and a general mail-
ing167 on the vulnerable consumer are identical, and clearly R.MJ. states that
the first amendment protects general mailings. The conclusion is obvious: no
state interest justifies a prophylactic ban on direct mail advertising. The provi-
sions in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct fail on the first element of the Central Hudson test and
thus violate the Constitution.
In addition to requiring a substantial state interest, the Central Hudson test
requires that state regulation of advertising or solicitation be no more extensive
than necessary to serve the interests advanced. Assuming that the dangers of
overreaching and undue influence exist in direct mail advertising, the proper
inquiry is whether a ban on direct mail goes beyond what is necessary to prevent
overreaching and undue influence. In answering this question, a court must
look for any available alternative to blanket suppression of direct mail. Three
such alternatives deserve attention.
First, a "safe harbor"'168 could be established. The bar could formulate
direct mail advertising that does not overreach and could make the material
available as models for attorneys who wish to advertise through direct mail.
Attorneys who use the bar's material substantially verbatim would be safe from
disciplinary action. Mailings that deviate from the safe harbor could be grounds
for discipline, depending on their content. However, the problems with this ap-
proach are considerable. It is doubtful that a bar reluctant to permit advertising
would create a formula with enough flexibility to protect freedom of speech.
Furthermore, if consumers are unable to distinguish between mailings, they will
remain uninformed. If all of the mailings are similar, they will provide the con-
sumer no basis on which to make an informed decision. In addition, the safe
harbor approach does not take into account the fact consumers differ. A direct
mail advertisement may be genuinely helpful to one consumer and work undue
influence on another. The idiosyncracies of individual consumers, however,
should not dictate whether consumers generally have access to information
through the media, nor should they dictate the first amendment protection af-
forded commercial speech.
166. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374.
167. A general mailing means postal distribution of advertising to random consumers. Direct
mailing targets consumers in need of legal advice; a general mailing does not.
168. This term was employed in R.M.J, 455 U.S. at 194 n.4, to describe a rule listing categories
of information that could be advertised.
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The second alternative would be to form a screening committee to review
the propriety of individual direct mailings.169 The use of a committee promotes
more flexibility than does the use of a rigid formula because each mailing is
examined separately. But the problems associated with lack of distinctiveness,
with the bar's reluctance to permit extensive advertising or solicitation, and with
differences among consumers remain.
The third approach was suggested in Zauderer: A requirement that spe-
cific statements be included in all direct mail solicitation.1 70 The Court has low-
ered the test for constitutionality of these required statements, and only a
reasonable relationship between a government interest and the affirmative re-
quirement must be shown. This lenient standard, however, creates potential
problems. Bars, which are predisposed against advertising or solicitation, could
impose regulations requiring that extensive, albeit helpful, information be in-
cluded.1 7 1 The result, as with the safe harbor approach, would be to render
mailings uninteresting and indistinguishable from one another. This result
would render all advertising ineffective, and attorney advertisers would not be
interested in sending ineffective direct mail. Consumers ultimately would suffer
since they would not receive vital information.
Each of these three approaches falls within the bounds of reason, but each
places considerable limits on direct mail solicitation. At the very least, affirma-
tive speech requirements should be subject to a level of scrutiny above mere
reasonableness. An outright ban on direct mail solicitation, the most restrictive
measure, clearly extends beyond the state's interests, fails to pass the third ele-
ment of the Central Hudson test, and should not be upheld by a reviewing court.
That a state can regulate within constitutional limits does not mean that it
should. The simple solution to these problems, and by far the best solution, is to
allow attorneys to use any type or method of advertisement that contains infor-
mation which is not false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. 172 The problems
169. See In re Von Wiegan, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 175, 470 N.E.2d 838, 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 47
(1984) (less drastic alternative of filing direct mail with the State Bar), on remand, 108 A.D.2d 1012,
485 N.Y.S.2d 399, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
170. If this is the method chosen by a bar association, then it is imperative that the affirmative
requirement-the compelled speech-be clearly delineated. The Zauderer majority reached an odd
result on a less than clear requirement. The Court ruled that the degree of punishment inflicted
determined whether an affirmative requirement violated either the first amendment or the due pro-
cess clause. Had the requirement been even more opaque, the Court probably would have reached a
different result on this issue. See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2281-83 & n.15.
The majority in Posadas rejected this alternative as a less extensive means of regulation when
the state has the right to ban the underlying activity advertised. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979. How-
ever, this case has limited application to attorney advertising and solicitation cases because the state
has no right to ban the practice of law. The Posadas decision gave no indication that a state's ability
merely to regulate a certain activity also gives that state the authority to restrict advertising. For a
discussion of Posadas, see supra text accompanying notes 120-26.
171. The majority in Zauderer noted that regulations which went too far were "burdensome,"
chilled speech, and therefore would be unconstitutional. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282. It is unclear
how the Court expects to decide which regulations chill speech impermissibly using a "reasonable-
ness" standard.
172. Advertisers have argued that the determination of what advertising "misleads" could
thwart protection of deserving advertisements. The Federal Trade Commission has created a large
body of law that addresses the question of determining whether advertisements are misleading. This
FTC law should be the basis of any bar regulation that establishes the definition of "misleading."
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with advertising that concern the state center around the conduct of attorneys,
not their advertisements. The rationale of Virginia Pharmacy is relevant: the
conduct of attorneys, like the conduct of pharmacists, merits state attention. At-
torney advertising and solicitation-in any form or fashion that is truthful and
not misleading-does not merit such attention.173 For example, the rules that
govern attorney conduct prohibit an attorney from filing a meritless claim. 174
These rules encourage professionalism in an attorney's day-to-day activities.
These are the rules that must be enforced to protect consumers and maintain the
integrity of the legal system. Studies indicate that these rules are not enforced
effectively.175 One alternative to self-regulation is to remove the task of policing
ranks from the legal profession. This would be a drastic step and should not be
taken unless less drastic measures fail. State bars could retain their disciplinary
function by strengthening the present system, by investing more money in disci-
plinary bodies for the purpose of investigation, by informing consumers of their
rights against attorneys, and by imposing strict reporting requirements on fellow
bar members who know of misconduct.
However, the problem of encouraging advertising and solicitation in a bar
that is hopelessly divided on the issue of any advertising remains. It is unrealis-
tic to rely on the bar to encourage attorneys to reach out to consumers through
the media. The sentiments against advertising and solicitation are too firmly
entrenched for the bar to make the necessary changes. The responsibility rests
See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2283. For a discussion of FTC regulation of misleading advertisements,
see E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1978).
173. For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy, see supra text accompanying notes 57-68. Rules
have been promulgated that adopt this expansive view of advertising. The Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyers Foundation is one organization with expansive, and workable, rules on advertising:
CHAPTER VII.
INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES
Rules
7.1 A lawyer shall not knowingly make any representation that is materially false or
misleading, and that might reasonably be expected to induce reliance by a member of the
public in the selection of counsel.
7.2 A lawyer shall not advertise for or solicit clients in a way that violates a valid law
imposing reasonable restrictions regarding time or place.
7.3 A lawyer shall not advertise for or solicit clients through another person when the
lawyer knows, or could reasonably ascertain, that such conduct violates a contractual or
other legal obligation of that other person.
7.4 A lawyer shall not solicit a member of the public when the lawyer has been told by
that person or someone acting on that person's behalf that he or she does not want to
receive communications from the lawyer.
7.5 A lawyer who advertises for or solicits clients through another person shall be as
responsible for that person's representations to and dealings with potential clients as if the
lawyer acted personally.
ROSCOE POUND-AM. TRIAL LAW. FOUND., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 701
(Discussion Draft 1980).
174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109(A)(2) (1981).
175. See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMMFITEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLI-
NARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Fi-
nal Draft 1970) (reporting results of comprehensive study of all state disciplinary systems and
suggesting solutions to problems uncovered). See also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT: MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 208 (1981) (legal background to Rule 8.3:
rule requiring other attorneys to report misconduct "has been essentially a dead letter").
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with the courts. 176 Courts must establish rules that force bars to permit adver-
tising and solicitation. If this issue is to be resolved and the consumer is to be
informed, then the Supreme Court must expand its decisions in attorney adver-
tising cases. The Court has held that the Constitution protects commercial
speech because it is valuable to consumers and to our market economy. 177 The
Court's holdings in the attorney advertising and solicitation cases are wholly
inconsistent with its reasons for protecting commercial speech. The Court
should no longer limit its holdings to narrow fact situations. Consumers will
remain uninformed, the purpose of commercial speech protection will remain
unfulfilled, and the legal profession will remain hopelessly deadlocked until the
Supreme Court establishes general rules encouraging attorney advertising and
solicitation.
The intermediate level of protection for commercial speech has proved un-
satisfactory as applied to attorney advertising and solicitation because it fails to
provide guidance to attorneys who wish to advertise and solicit. Attorneys,
aware that legal advertising and solicitation is protected by the first amendment
but discouraged by the bar and many judges, are understandably reluctant to
advertise. Thus, the legal profession has failed to inform consumers and, as a
result, many people do not receive the legal assistance they need.
The Supreme Court should encourage attorney advertising and solicitation
as the only effective means to reach many consumers needing legal assistance.
To do this, the Court must establish general guidelines that protect and en-
courage attorney advertising and solicitation. To date, the Supreme Court has
failed to establish the boundaries of first amendment protection of attorney's
commercial speech. The resistance to any advertising from the American bar is
high, and the bar itself has proved unable to establish the flexible rules necessary
to encourage the use of the media by attorneys to reach consumers. Until the
Supreme Court establishes clear guidelines and removes existing impediments
imposed by Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules
2-103(A) and 2-103(E) and Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3, at-
torneys are unlikely to advertise extensively. The uninformed consumer bears
the ensuing injury.
DOROTHY VIRGINIA KIBLER
176. Another possibility would be to entrust this change to the legislature. But that is entrusting
the changes to attorneys and politicians who will be influenced by attorneys who disfavor advertis-
ing. The only realistic chance for change is through the courts.
177. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65.
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